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PIGOUVIAN TAX AND THE CONGESTION EXTERNALITY:
A BENEFIT SIDE APPROACH
Kenneth S. Lyon and Dug Man Lee

ABSTRACT

A Pigouvian tax, in the form of an entrance fee or a toll, has been proposed to be an
efficient resolution of a congestion externality. This proposition is founded on the
theoretical basis of the profit maximization principle. We, however, have not found
literature that examines a Pigouvian tax as a resolution of a congestion externality on
the basis of utility maximization. In this sense, the aim of this paper is to show that a
Pigouvian tax is also an adequate policy resolution of a congestion externality to attain
Pareto optimality under utility maximization. Taking, for example, the open access
freeway, we will not only identify both marginal private benefit and marginal social
benefit, but also assess the divergence between marginal private benefit and marginal
social benefit. As a consequence, we will investigate the price-taker individual's
contribution to the congestion externality and measure, in the theoretical sense, how
large an entrance fee or toll that should be charged to attain Pareto optimality. In
particular, since an open access freeway has the characteristics of common property
resource, we will prove that average social congestion cost is essentially equal to
marginal private congestion cost in our modeling framework. Finally, we will show
that the optimal value of trip derived in our model is the same as that generated on
profit maximization approach.
JEL Classification: H21, H23
Keywords :
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marginal social benefit

PIGOUVIAN TAX AND THE CONGESTION EXTERNALITY:
A BENEFIT SIDE APPROACH

INTRODUCTION
Congestion externality has a long history as one of important subjects in
economics. A.C. Pigou (1920) initially tackled this problem in his famous book, The
Economics a/Welfare, taking an example of the case of two roads. Knight (1923) also
analyzed it in more detail and proved that if the owner of a superior road charges a toll
for its use, this behavior will maximize the total product of both roads. For his
arguments, he illustrated two alternative methods of analyzing the two-road problem,
one is the cost side approach hinged on increasing costs, and the other is product side
approach based on diminishing returns. Since Knight described his idea on congestion
externality problem, follow-up literatures (Walters 1960, Samuelson 1974, Wizman
1974) have also suggested a Pigouvian tax, lin the form of an entrance fee (rents) or a
toll, as a resolution of a congestion externality. Their propositions are founded on the
theoretical basis of the profit-maximizing principle. We, however, have not found
literature that examines a Pigouvian tax as resolution of a congestion externality on the
basis of utility maximization.
In this sense, the aim of this paper is to show that a Pigouvian tax is also an

adequate policy resolution of a congestion externality to attain Pareto optimality under
utility maximization. Taking, for example, the open access freeway, we will not only
identify both marginal private benefit and marginal social benefit. As usual, an
open-access freeway is accounted as a common property resource since it is
nonexc1usively owned, and we will also prove that average social congestion cost is
essentially equal to marginal private congestion cost in our model. We next identify a

2

price-taker individual's utility maximization problem, and derive an expression for
marginal private benefit. Following this we solve the Pareto optimality problem to
identify marginal social benefit at the optimum. With these models, we will not only
investigate the price-taker individual's contribution to the congestion externality, but also
estimate, in the theoretical sense, how large an entrance fee or a toll should be charged to
attain Pareto optimality.

PRICE-T AKER INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM.
A price-taker individual (denoted as superscript b) is posited to maximize his
utility. To set up the individual's utility maximization problem, we define the individual's
utility function as u b (

c; , ~ Y
C

,

b,

h b) with potential derivatives ut, u~ ,u~ > 0 where

c is
1

a composite consumption good (money-numeraire good), c2 is a composite consumption
good connected with leisure time, y is the number of trips per time period, and h is hours
worked. The individual is constrained by both a budget and a time constraint. Under these
conditions, the individual's utility maximization problem is as follows:

( 1)

Max u b (cb1 ' c2b ,yb , h b )

Subject to

(4)

3

where Iy is the time-price or time coefficient of a trip with g capturing the effects of
congestion, Py is the money price of a trip, w is the wage rate, b is non-labor income, the
12 is time price or time coefficient for the consumption of c2, and T is total amount of

time in the time period. Superscript a denotes a composition all individuals except
individual b , and g is the index of congestion.
The Lagrangian function is

L = u b(cf ,c~ ,yb ,hb) + Al (whb + b -

c[ - P2C~ -

b
p yyb) + A2 (T - 12C~ - Iyyb - h )

Some of the first order necessary conditions of this problem are
bEB

) - A~

bEB

) - A~ P2 - A~/2

(5)

U ~l (v

(6)

u:2(v

(7)

u~(vbEB)-A~Py _A~[g'(y a

(8)

u% (v b®) + ~®w - A~

where

Vb

=0
=0
+ ybffi)ybffi +g(ya + ybffi)] = 0

=0

is a vector containing

cf, c~ ,yf , and

h b as elements. The super EB indicates

optimal values. We use c1 as the numeraire and use the marginal rate of substitution as
the measure of value. We can derive the following expression for the value of a trip (See
the Appendix for the derivation);
(9)

S~IY (v bEB ) = [S~Ih (v bffi ) + W ][g' (y a + ybffi )ybffi + g(y a + ybffi)] + P y

where S denotes the marginal rate of substitution. In equation (9), we can observe that the
term, [g' (yQ + yb® )yb® + g(yQ + yb®)], denotes the marginal private time congestion
cost (MPCC) . This follows from the total private time congestion cost, 1y.yb. Also,
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S ~lh (V bEe) is the value at the margin of h, work time, in terms of C1 , and w is wage rate;
thus [S~lh (v bEe ) + w] denotes the marginal value of h in terms of both time on the job
and the money income that is earned. Hence, we can interpret the term,

time congestion cost (VMPCC).

PARETO OPTIMALITY PROBLEM
To identify society'S Pareto optimality conditions in the face of congestion
externality, we examine the following maximization problem. Individual b's utility is
maximized subject to given utility level for Individual a, who stands for everyone eIsel,
and other constraints. The optimization problem for Pareto optimality is
(10)

b yb h b)
Max Ub(Clb' c2'
,

Subject to

b

r b =0

(11)

t2C~ + tyyb + h -

(12)

Q Q
uQ(cl ' c2' yQ , hQ) - u Qo

(13)

Q
t2 c2 + tyyQ + hQ -

(14)

ty

(15)

c1Q+c1b -c1 = 0

(16)

c2Q+ c2b - c2

= g(y) = g(yb

=0

r Q= 0
+ ya)

g ' >0

=0

I We could use the sum of everyone else, which would be technically more appropriate; however, this
would not have a substantive effect.
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where H is the production possibility function. For this optimization problem, the
Lagrangian function is

Some of the first order necessary conditions are
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
where vais a vector containing c~ , c~ , ya , and h a as elements, and also v is a vector
having c1 , c2 ,Y, and h as elements. The super asterisk implies optimal values. Note that
c] is the money numaeraire, and if we have a commodity with no money price but a time
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price, we could make it the time-numeraire commodity. Manipulating the first order
necessary conditions of this problem, the marginal social benefit for yb is

and the marginal social benefit for ya would be
(29)

S :ly (v a*) = [S

:lh (v a*) + W* ] [g' (y *)y a* + g (y *)] + [Silh (v b*) + W* ]g ,(y * )Y b*

where S is marginal rate of substitution, w * is the wage rate, and RO r* is the rate of
transformation at the optimum (See the Appendix for the derivation).
We now examine equation (28) in detail. The first term, [S;lh(Vb*)+W*]
[g' (y * ) Y b* + g(y * )], denotes the internal time cost to Individual b of consuming freeway

services. It is the value of the marginal private time congestion cost (VMPCC) as described
in connection with equation (9). The second term, [S:lh(V a*) +w*]g'(y*)ya*, is the
external time cost, which is the value of the marginal time cost to Individual a incurred
because of b'S freeway usage. Ifwe compare equation (9) with equation (28), we can easily
see that there exists divergence between the marginal private benefit and the marginal
social benefit at a given quantity of yb . This divergence is the external time cost. The

2

We know that Rarely (/) = H y (/) / H el (/) along production possibility cmve, and to attain Pareto

optimality, Rarely (v *) should be equal to Sely (v *) , which is the value of trips per time period in terms
of cl. Thus we can identify that Rarely (v *) = Py at Pareto optimality. In this we assume price-taker firms.

7
optimal Pigouvian tax would, therefore, be [S;lh (va*) + W* ]g' (y * )ya* . This tax would give
Individual b the incentive to adjust his/her usage of freeway services to the efficient level.
This Pigouvian tax coincides with the profit or wealth maximizing toll as shown below.
Using equations (9) and (28), we can draw Figure 1 as the mirror image of the one
depicted in literature that studied congestion externality on the basis of profit
maximization. Figure 1 not only identifies the extent of Individual

blS

over-utilization of

the freeway, but also depicts the Pigouvian tax that could be levied to attain Pareto
optimality. In the Figure, the distance of ybffi - yb* denotes the over-utilization of
freeway service of the price-taker individual, and the length of AB gives the Pigouvian

$

S:1 y (yb,V bEB )_[S:1h(yb,V bEB )+ w][g'(ya + yb)yb

+ g(ya + yb)]
S ~1Y (y b , vb* ) - [S ~1h (y b , vb* ) + w * ][ g , (y a* + y b ) Y b

:1

+ g (y a* + y b )] + [S h (y a* , V a*) +

W

* ] g , (y a* + y b ) Y a*

~------~------~-----------------

Y

b*

l
Figure 1

Also we let w *

=H h (v *) / H cl (v *) , which is the value at the marginal product of labor in the production

of cl , our numeraire good.
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vector containing

cf , c~ ,yf as elements, and

va is also a vector having cf , c~ ,ya as

elements.
We now discuss the proposition that the average social congestion cost is
essentially equal to the marginal private congestion cost. The social time congestion cost
is defined as g(y) y ; thus, the average social congestion cost (ASCC) is g(y) and the
marginal social time congestion cost (MSCC) is gl(y)y + g(y) . To simplify the
discussion, we assume that Individual b is a typical individual so that it is reasonable to
assume that S~lh (v b*) = S:lh (va*) . In addition, we assume that these rates of substitution
are constant over the range of the variables discussed. Let this constant value be given by
S;lh. Using equation (28) the value of the marginal social time congestion cost at the

optimum is

and using equation (9) the value of the marginal value of private time congestion cost at
Individual

blS

optimum is

To reach the conclusion that the value of the marginal private time congestion cost is
essentially equal to the value of the average social time congestion cost, we assume that
g does not change rapidly so that g (y b* + y a* ) and g (y bEa + ya) are approximately
I

3

I

I

If the index of congestion, g , and S:lh (v a*) were known, we could estimate g'(y *) and thereby

measure the term, [S :lh (v a* ) + w * ]g (y * )y a* . However, estimation of the congestion cost is beyond the
I

scope of this paper.
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equal. Because yb is small compared with yG , which is for everyone else,
g ' (ybE9 + yG)ybE9 is small compared withg' (yb* + yG*)y*. When ybE9 is imperceptible
g ' (ybE9 + yG )ybE9 is essentially equal to zero. Another justification for ignoring this term

is that it is Individual blS own marginal effect on congestion and the individual can be
expected to ignore this effect. When I enter a congested area it is not my effect that I
notice, rather it is the effect of others. With this product essentially equal to zero the
value of marginal private time congestion cost is essentially equal to the value of average
social time congestion cost. This is a very common conclusion in this literature; hence,
one view of this paragraph is that this is a sufficient set of assumptions to generate this
conclusion.
We now explore how these results on utility maximization approach are related
with those on the profit maximization approach. Frank Knight proved that private
ownership ofPigouls narrow road would lead to a maximization of the value of the road
and a social optimum. Our results yield the same conclusion for the same reason. The
right most curve in Figure 1 is Individual blS demand function for trips in inverse form.
Because we seek information about a toll that is charged in addition to Py , we are
interested only in the portion of the curve above of p y . The sum of these curves over all
individuals yields the aggregate demand function for trips and is the average social value
curve; hence the associated marginal curve is the marginal social value curve. We assume,
as is usual, that the marginal cost of collecting the toll is zero; hence the toll that would
maximize total profits (wealth) to the toll collector is where marginal revenue equals zero .
This is where marginal social value equal zero, but since we subtracted out p y in Figure 1,
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this is where marginal social value equals p y ; hence, this approach yields the optimal
value depicted in Figure 1. This optimal value of trip will be the same as that generated
on profit or wealth maximization approach.

SUMMARY
In this paper we have shown that a Pigouvian tax is an adequate resolution of
congestion externality to attain Pareto optimality using utility maximization. For this
objective, taking an open access freeway as an example, we not only derived both
marginal private benefit and marginal social benefit, but also assessed the divergence
between marginal private benefit and marginal social benefit. As a result, we identified
that the amount of a Pigouvian tax should be the same amount as the external time cost,
which is the value of the marginal time cost to Individual a incurred by Individual b
through freeway congestion. This Pigouvian tax coincides with the profit or wealth
maximizing toll suggested by literature on the basis of profit maximization. In addition,
because an open access freeway is accounted as common property resource, we proved
that average social congestion cost is essentially equal to marginal private congestion cost
in our model.
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APPENDIX
Derivation of equation (9)
We get from equation (5)

From equation (8)

Combining these two results with equation (7),

From this manipulation, we can derive equation (9)

S ~l Y (v bEB) = [S ~lh (v bEB) + w] [g' (ya + y bEB ) Y bEB + g(ya + y bEB )] + p y
Derivation of equation (28)
We can get from equation (20)

From equation (23)

From equation (22)

12
(A-I)
From equation (24)

') *
.lL2

= -Uclb (V b*) / U c1a (V a*)

From equation (27)

[u ~1 (V b*) / U:1(Va*)]U ~ (Va*) - ~ - [U ~1 (V b*) / H cl (V *)]H h(V *)

= 0,

A; = [u ~1 (V b* ) / U:1(V a* ) ]U ~ (V a* ) - [U~1 (V b* ) / H c 1 (V * )]H h(V* )
With these results, equation (A-I) can be rearranged into,

b ( b*) [U ha(V a*) / U c1a (V a*) - H h (V *) / H c1 (*
b (v b* ) = 0
V ) ]g '(Y * ) Y a* - [H y (V * ) / H c1 (v * )]u c1

- U c1 V

+ [u ~ (v a* ) / u:1(v a*) - H h(v * ) / H c 1 (V *) ]g ,(y *) y a* + H y (V *) / He 1 (V *)
This completes the derivation of equation (28),
b
b*
b
b*
* b* +g(y)]+[Sclh(V
*
a
a*
* ' (y)y
* a*
Scly(V
)=[Sclh(V
)+w * ][g ' (y)y
)+w]g

Equation (29) can be also derived using the same method.
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Pigouvian Tax and the Congestion Externality:
A Benefit Side Approach
ABSTRACT
A Pigouvian tax, in the form of entrance fee or a toll, has been proposed to be an
efficient resolution of a congestion externality. This proposition is founded on the
theoretical basis of profit maximization principle. We, however, have not found literature
that examines a Pigouvian tax as a resolution of a congestion externality on the basis of
utility maximization. In this sense, the aim of this paper is to show that a Pigcfian tax is
also an adequate policy resolution of a congestion externality to attain Pareto optimality
under utility maximization. Taking, for example, the open access freeway, we will not
only identify both marginal private benefit and marginal social benefit, but also assess the
divergence between marginal private benefit and marginal social benefit. As a
consequence, we will investigate the price-taker individual's contribution to the
congestion externality and measure, in the theoretical sense, how large an entrance fee or
toll that should be charged to attain Pareto optimality. In particular, since an open access
freeway has the characteristics of common property resource we will prove that average
social congestion cost is essentially equal to marginal private congestion cost in our
modeling framework. Finally, we will show that the optimal value of trip derived in our
model is the same as that generated on profit maximization approach.

2

INTRODUCTION
Congestion externality has a long history as one of important subjects in
economics. A.C . Pigou (1920) initially tackled this problem in his famous book, The

Economics of Welfare , taking an example of the case of two roads. Knight (1923) also
analyzed it in more detail and proved that if the owner of a superior road charges a toll
for its use, this behavior will maximize the total product of both roads. For his arguments,
he illustrated two alternative methods of analyzing the two road problem, one is the cost
side approach hinged on increasing costs, and the other is product side approach based on
diminishing returns. Since Knight described his idea on congestion externality problem,
follow-up literatures (Walters 1960, Samuelson 1974, Weizman 1974) have also
suggested a Pigouvian tax, in the form of an entrance fee (rents) or a toll, as a resolution
of a congestion externality. Their propositions are founded on the theoretical basis of the
profit maximizing principle. We, however, have not found literature that examines a
Pigouvian tax as resolution of a congestion externality on the basis of utility
maximization.
In this sense, the aim of this paper is to show that a Pigouvian tax is also an

adequate policy resolution of a congestion externality to attain Q

o optimality under

utility maximization. Taking, for example, the open access freeway, we will not only
identify both marginal private benefit and marginal social benefit, but also assess the
difference between marginal private benefit and marginal social benefit. As usual, an
open-access freeway is accounted as a common property resource since it is nonexclusively owned, and we will also prove that average social congestion cost is
essentially equal to marginal private congestion cost in our model. We next identify a
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